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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
DERRICK H. BELL, 
Ap~ellant 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00161) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 
March 9,2007 
Before: SLOVITER and AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK,' District Judge 
(Filed: May 25,2007) 
OPINION 
* Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by 
designation. 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Derrick Bell pled guilty in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to a one-count information charging him 
with distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, crack cocaine from a time 
unknown through January 23,2003, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 5 841 (a)(l). The District 
Court exercised jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 5 323 1. Judge Comer 
sentenced Bell to a 170-month term of incarceration on January 28,2005. 
Bell appealed, and his court-appointed appellate counsel, Gary L. Kelley (who 
was also Bell's retained counsel in the District Court), filed an Anders motion seeking to 
withdraw as counsel, asserting that all potential grounds for appeal are frivolous. We 
have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1291. At the outset, we note 
that Mr. Kelley has markedly failed to fulfill his Anders responsibilities. However, 
because, after our own review of the record, we find that there are no non-frivolous 
issues on appeal, we will nevertheless affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence 
and grant Mr. Kelley's motion to withdraw. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss only those facts necessary 
to our decision. On June 25,2003, Bell was charged by indictment with distribution of, 
and possession with intent to distribute, five grams or more of crack cocaine. At his 
initial appearance, he pled not guilty. One year later, on July 2 1,2004, the grand jury 
returned a superseding indictment in which Bell was again charged with distribution of, 
and possession with intent to distribute, crack cocaine. However, in the superseding 
indictment, the grand jury made special findings that Bell distributed and possessed with 
the intent to distribute between 50 and 150 grams of crack cocaine and that he had at 
least two previous felony drug convictions. Bell again pled not guilty, and on September 
1 0,2004, Judge Conner prepared for jury selection in Bell's trial. 
On September 13,2004-after the jury had been selected in his case-Bell pled 
guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Bell 
waived his right to indictment by a grand jury and agreed to plead guilty to an 
information that would be filed by the government once the plea was accepted. The 
information charged distribution of, and intent to distribute, crack cocaine, but, as part of 
the plea agreement, did not include a specific drug weight. Thus, whereas Bell had been 
facing a statutory maximum of forty years under the initial indictment, and life 
imprisonment under the superseding indictment, the statutory maximum under the 
information was only twenty years. The government additionally agreed to recommend a 
two-level credit for acceptance of responsibility (if warranted). 
Two months after changing his plea, Bell filed apro se motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, but he withdrew his motion to withdraw the following month. On January 
28,2005, Judge Conner sentenced Bell to a 170-month term of imprisonment, a $500 
fine, $500 restitution, a $100 special assessment, and a three-year term of supervised 
release. Bell filed a notice of appeal on February 7,2005. On March 17,2006, Bell 
wrote a letter to his attorney, Mr. Kelley, describing eighteen issues he thought the 
attorney should raise on appeal. Mr. Kelley filed his Anders brief on April 3,2006. 
If a criminal defendant wishes to appeal hisher case but counsel, after thorough 
review of the record, cannot find any appealable issue, counsel may file what is known 
as an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,744 (1967); Third Circuit 
Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a). Rule 109.2(a) reflects the Third Circuit's 
implementation of Anders: 
Where, upon review of the district court record, trial counsel is persuaded 
that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, trial counsel may file a 
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, [I8 L. Ed.2d 4931 (1967), which shall be served upon 
the appellant and the United States. The United States shall file a brief in 
response. Appellant may also file a brief in response pro se. After all briefs have 
been filed, the clerk will refer the case to a merits panel. If the panel agrees that 
the appeal is without merit, it will grant trial counsel's Anders motion, and 
dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel. If the panel finds 
arguable merit to the appeal, it will discharge current counsel, appoint substitute 
counsel, restore the case to the calendar, and order supplemental briefing. 
In assessing an Anders brief, we must determine: "(1) whether counsel adequately 
fulfilled the rule's requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record 
presents any non-frivolous issues." United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296,300 (3d Cir. 
2001) (explaining Rule 109.2(a)). We first examine whether Mr. Kelley fulfilled the 
requirements of Rule 109.2(a) and then turn to the issue of our independent review. 
A. 
As Rule 109.2(a) reflects, "The duties of counsel when preparing an Anders brief 
are (1) to satisfy the court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of 
appealable issues, and (2) to explain why such issues are fiivolous." Youla, 241 F.3d at 
300. In the instant case, counsel has done neither. To the contrary, all Mr. Kelley has 
done is reproduce seriatim the eighteen issues that defendant Bell related to him in his 
letter of March 17,2006. The Anders document Mr. Kelley filed contains no 
explanation of the issues listed therein, nor has Mi. Kelley provided any legal analysis to 
demonstrate why these issues are fiivolous. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Anders 
filing (to call the filing an Anders "brief' would be problematic, since the word carries 
the connotation of professionalism) to suggest that Mr. Kelley ever undertook an 
examination of the record in search of non-frivolous issues for appeal. 
By contrast, Bell has filed twopro se briefs on appeal. These briefs present 
contentions which, in the aggregate, may be grouped as presenting three issues: (1) 
whether the information to which Bell pled guilty contained an improper amendment of 
the charges against him because he was initially charged by indictment but then pled 
guilty to an information; (2) whether the district judge correctly determined Bell's 
sentence based on the drug being "crack cocaine" rather than another form of cocaine 
base (which would have resulted in a lesser sentence); and (3) whether Mi. Kelley, as 
counsel in the District Court, was ineffective for (a) being unprepared for trial, 
prompting Bell to plead guilty; (b) failing to object at sentencing or elsewhere that the 
information improperly amended the charge against him; and (c) failing to object at 
sentencing or elsewhere that the District Court erroneously determined that the 
controlled substance at issue was crack cocaine and not some other form of cocaine 
base.' When apro se criminal defendant with limited high-school education files a 
substantially more searching brief than his attorney, it is apparent that counsel has not 
come close to hlfilling his Anders responsibilities. 
B. 
Where an Anders brief does not comport with the minimum standards set forth 
above, the court has the authority to deny counsel's motion to withdraw and order further 
briefing. See United States v. Marvin, 2 1 1 F.3d 778,782 (3d Cir. 2000). However, a 
narrow exception exists for cases where the court of appeals, upon independent review, 
finds that the "frivolousness [of the appeal] is patent." Id. at 78 1. We find that this is 
such a case. 
Our independent review of the record in this case, including the plea hearing 
transcript, pre-sentencing investigation report, and sentencing hearing transcript, 
confirms that Bell voluntarily and knowingly pled guilty to the information and admitted 
that crack cocaine, rather than any other form of cocaine base, was at issue. 
The government responded to Bell's pro se brief and 
supplemental brief with a detailed and well-researched thirty-page 
opposition. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the first two sets of issues raised in his pro se briefs are 
without merit. 
With regard to Bell's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, we note that 
ineffective assistance claims are usually pursued in a collateral proceeding, rather than 
on direct appeal. See United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 5 87, 598 (3d Cir. 
1989), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 528 (3d Cir. 
1996). "There is, however, a narrow exception to the rule that defendants cannot attack 
the efficacy of their counsel on direct appeal. Where the record is sufficient to allow 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel, an evidentiary hearing to develop the 
facts is not needed." United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991). The 
government, however, contends that this court cannot make a determination whether 
counsel was ineffective on the basis of the record at hand. We concur in that assessment. 
(We would add that, even if the record shed more light than it does on Bell's claims of 
ineffective assistance, we think it unlikely .that Mr. Kelley would be an effective 
advocate with respect to those claims.) 
111. 
Because the issues raised on appeal (other than the ineffective-assistance-of- 
counsel-claims, the merits of which are not properly before us at this time) are patently 
without merit, we will affirm Derrick Bell's conviction and ~entence .~  Mr. Kelley, 
defendant's court-appointed appellate counsel, is granted leave to withdraw. But Mr. 
Kelley is, via this opinion, advised that we find his performance in representing 
defendant in this appeal to have been seriously deficient. Such a departure from 
accepted professional standards should not be repeated. Under these circumstances, Mr. 
Kelley may conclude that it would be the better part of prudence not to seek fees for his 
services on Bell's behalf on appeal. CJ: United States v. Bennett, No. 04-3225,2007 WL 
760965, at *2 (3d Cir. March 14,2007). If Mr. Kelley does wish to seek fees, the court 
will entertain a submission from Mr. Kelley explaining his efforts. 
As to the issues listed in Mr. Kelley's Anders filing, the 
government did not address each in turn, and neither do we. It is 
sufficient to hold that, after an independent review of the record, 
we find that there exist no non-frivolous issues that we can address 
on this appeal. 
